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THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
Steven J. Eaglet

INTRODUCTION

The pervasiveness and importance of environmental interests
makes protecting the environment an important focus of the American
legal system. But perceptions of the nature of the "environment" and
environmental "interests" differ, leading to sharp divisions regarding
both the substance of desirable environmental rules and the nature of
the institutions that are to define and enforce them.
Throughout most of American history, the common law was the
principal institution for mediating conflicting claims about rights.
Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
described the common law in 1854 as "a few broad and
comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and
enlightened public policy, modified and adapted to the circumstances
of all the particular cases which fall within it."'
The three great bodies of the common law are property, by which
the rights of individuals regarding things are established and
perfected; contract, by which those rights are exchanged through
mutual consent; and tort, by which harm to those rights is rectified. In
each of its branches, the focus of the common law was upon bilateral
relationships, principally those of property owner and stranger to title,
contract buyer and seller, and tort victim and tortfeasor. 2

t Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Virginia
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Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 67 Mass. 263,267 (1854).
2

See generally, ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
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Our understanding of "property",3 did not emerge full-blown, but
rather evolved over almost a millennium. 4 The principal drafter of the
Constitution, James Madison, declared that "[g]overnment is
instituted to protect property of every sort; ...This being the end of
government, that alone is a just government, which impartially
secures to every man, whatever is his own." 5 In contemporary
scholarship, property rights have been termed the "great focus" of the
Framers, 6 and the "guardian of every other right.",7
Given the importance of property rights to our liberty and
prosperity, and the importance of the environment to our well being,
the resolution of tensions between them is one of the most important
tasks of our legal and political systems.
Individual landowners have perceived environmental harms
largely in terms of unreasonable interference with land use created by
neighbors. For many centuries, such allegations have been the subject
of nuisance law.8 Common law private nuisance actions, like other
tort actions, are intended to rectify harms to individual rights.
Similarly, public nuisance actions rectify harms to the rights of
aggregates of individuals within a community. Thus, property rights,
including those in environmental amenities, were protected by an
approach through which past harms were compensated and future
harms thus discouraged.
3 The term "property" is a very broad one, encompassing not only things over which an
individual might have dominion, but also other tangible and intangible rights, the potential
possession of which are the attributes of fully participating adults in a civilized society. See John
Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (ed. Peter
Laslett) §123 (1965) ("Lives, Liberties, and Estates, which I call by the general Name,
Property."); Property, 1 NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, at 174, reprinted in 4 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 480 (1865) ("As a man is said to have a right to his

property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.").
4 See Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (1996). "The Anglo-American case
precedent is literally made up of tens of thousands of cases defining property rights over the
better part of a millennium." Id. at 151.
5 James Madison, Property,NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprintedin 14 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 266 (R. Rutland et al. eds., 1983) (emphasis in original); see also, Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (2005) (quoting most of this
language).
6 JENNIFER
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CONSTITUTIONALISM 92 (1990) ("The great focus of the Framers was the security of basic
rights, property in particular, not the implementation of political liberty.").
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT (2d ed. 1998).

See Julian Morris, Climbing Out of the Hole: Sunsets, Subjective Value, the
Environment, and the English Common Law, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 343, 347-48 (2003)
(tracing the action for nuisance to the writ of novel disseisin, instituted in 1166 to protect the
rights of dispossessed owners). There is evidence that Roman Law contained similar rules and
that earlier customary courts in English employed similar rules as well. Id. at 347 n. 12 (citing
Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an old Manse: Another Look at some Historic Cases About
the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 765-66 (1979)).
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Where conduct harmful to the property rights of others might
nonetheless result in a net benefit to society, consensual adjustments
could be made by the parties themselves. By employing easements,
covenants, and similar devices, individuals could sell the right to be
free from trespass and nuisance. The erstwhile victim would be
compensated in full by his or her own lights, and the erstwhile
tortfeasor could engage in the more valuable activity. No elaborate
government inquiry was required to ascertain if the compensation was
more or less than sufficient, since each party preferred the bargain to
his or her former position. 9 Perhaps paradoxically, it is only by the
assurance of well-defined property rights that property becomes more
adaptable and flexible.
In recent decades, however, theorists have posited the
"disintegration" or "entropy" of property and agnosticism as to
whether longstanding property rights should have a preferred position
to conflicting claims.' 0 This goes hand in glove with objections to the
adjustment of environmental claims through consensual bargaining
and common law nuisance. Many of these protestations are practical
in nature, although often surmountable." Others simply reflect what
Dean James Huffman has called "a philosophical objection to
capitalism combined with a revival of the progressivist belief in
scientific management."'"
Concomitant with the de-emphasis of the common as a means of
harmonizing property and environmental concerns has been the
growth of environmental regulation by statute. Since the 1970s,
environmental protection largely has become a "top down" process,
in three senses of that term. One is centralization of policymaking.
Sweeping federal environmental statutes largely have supplanted the
States' police powers.' 3 Another is the collectivization of rights.
While the common law vindicated the rights of individuals and
groups of individuals in a community with similar claims, modem
environmental statutes envision collective rights that go beyond the
sum of individual rights. Finally, the mode of vindication of rights has
9 See James M. Buchanan, Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange: The Irrelevance of
Transaction Cost, reprinted in ECONOMICS: BETWEEN PREDICTIVE SCIENCE AND MORAL

PHILOSOPHY 161 (Robert D. Tollison & Victor J. Vanberg eds., 1987) (quoted in Todd J.
Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional
Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-NumberExternality Problems,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 974 n.42 (1996)).
10 See infra Part I1I.A.
I See infra Part III.C.
12 James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental Protection, 55 MONT. L.

REV. 425,427 (1994).
13See infra Part II.C.
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gone from the case-by-case accretion of precedent associated with the
common law to the categorical delineation of rights promulgated by
comprehensive laws.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPERATIVES

Since the 1970s, concern about the environment has become
ensconced in America's pantheon of moral imperatives-what Justice
Holmes referred to as "can't helps. 14 But visceral conviction must be
supplemented with a clearer understanding of our use of the term
"environment" and the nature of our ecology. Also, it must be
tempered by considerations of individual liberty. 5
Professor Carol Rose has noted that property rights and property
regulation are "aligned in a set of evolutionary overlapping
relationships."'16 Professor Bruce Yandle referred to the evolution of
property rights and regulation vis-A-vis the environment in terms of
the Schumpeterian model of "creative destruction," moving from an
open access regime to rules for resource use, to full-blown property
rights. 17 Our understanding of the environment has evolved as well.
A. Defining the Environment

"Environmental problems," and hence, environmental protection,
are social constructs. 18 In practice, the term "environment" is used as
a reification that encompasses aspects of biological, physical,
aesthetic and cultural significance. Legal definitions of "environment'

tend to be gauzy, 9 and legislative statements of environmental goals
14 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Lewis Einstein (June 17, 1908), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETrERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Jr. 70 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) ("as I

have said before all I mean by truth is what I can't help thinking. But my can't helps are outside
the scope of exhortation.").
is See infra Part III.
16 Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings
Jurisprudence-AnEvolutionaryApproach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 577-78 (1990).
7 Bruce Yandle, Creative Destruction and Environmental Law, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 155, 157-58 (2002) (citing JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY (Harper 1975) (1942)).
Is See Elizabeth Ann R. Bird, The Social Construction ofNature: Theoretical Approaches
to the History ofEnvironmental Problems, ENvTL. REV., Winter 1987, at 255. Bird asserts that
environmental problems are socially constructed, since "scientific knowledge should not be
regarded as a representation of nature," because, in turn, "the philosophy, history, and sociology
of science in the last twenty-five years have increasingly asserted and affirmed the relativism of
any particular scientific claims about nature. Id. at 255.
19 See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 8-0105(6) (McKinney 2008) (Environment is
defined as the "physical conditions which will be affected by a proposed action, including land,
air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or aesthetic significance, existing
patterns of population concentration, distribution, or growth, and existing community or
neighborhood character.").
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even more so. 20 Given the breadth of its subject matter, however, a
thoughtful definition of "environmental law" necessarily displays a
high level of generality:
Broadly stated, environmental law regulates human activity
in order to limit ecological impacts that threaten public health
and biodiversity. Its premise is not that any human
transformation of the ecosystem should be per se unlawful.
Environmental law's objective is far more nuanced. It
accepts, in light of the laws of thermodynamics, that
ecological transformation is both unavoidable and very often
desirable, yet it seeks to influence the kind, degree, and
2 pace
of those transformations resulting from human activity. '
In addition to a lack of specificity, however, the term "the
environment" manifests profound ambiguity. The primary dictionary
definition of "environment" is "surroundings. 22 The word's
secondary meaning involves the combination of conditions affecting
organisms, both biological and cultural. 23 "Environment" was used in
connection with surroundings as early as the 14th century, but in
with modem ecological concerns only since the mid-20th
connection
24
century.

From a philosophical or psychological perspective, the concept of
Gestalt often denotes the study of the relationship between
foreground and background.2 5 To the extent that the environment
20 See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 8-0101 (McKinney 2008) ("It is the purpose of this
act to declare a state policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and enhance human and community resources; and to enrich the understanding of
the ecological systems, natural, human and community resources important to the people of the
state.").
21 RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (2004).
22

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 4th ed. 2000

("The circumstances or conditions that surround one; surroundings.").
23 Id. ("2. The totality of circumstances surrounding an organism or group of organisms,
especially: a. The combination of external physical conditions that affect and influence the
growth, development, and survival of organisms: 'We shall never understand the natural
environment until we see it as a living organism' (Paul Brooks). b. The complex of social and
cultural conditions affecting the nature of an individual or community.").
24 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY V at 315 (2d ed. 1989). The Oxford English Dictionary
notes that "environment" is derived from the root "environ." Id.The latter term has several
citations from the 13th and 14th centuries, referring "[t]o form a ring round, surround, encircle."
Id.at 314. In the early 19th century, the familiar usage of environment as one's surroundings
was established, and only in the mid-20th century is the modem environmentalist's usage cited.
at 315.
By the 1980s, the colloquial "environment friendly" usage came into vogue. See id.
25 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY VI at 414 (2d ed. 1989) ("A 'shape', 'configuration', or
'structure' which as an object of perception forms a specific whole or unity incapable of
expression simply in terms of its parts (e.g. a melody in distinction from the notes that make it
up.").
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constitutes a backdrop, and that the plane of our focus is on the needs
and comforts of our human society, the goal of environmental
regulation is the prevention of unreasonable interference with land
uses. This concern is both the genesis of nuisance law and the
principal justification of zoning.26 On the other hand, if we view the
environment as the foreground, we are drawn to the concept of
"biodiversity," which encompasses approximately 1.5 million named
and catalogued species, and perhaps 3 million to 30 million unnamed
species. 27 The environment, thus viewed, also encompasses genetic
28
diversity within reproductive populations and diversity of habitat.
Indeed, just as habitat affects diversity of species, diversity of species
affects habitat.29
Given the almost ubiquitous use of the phrase "the environment"
in recent decades, searching for meaning in its etymology might seem
superfluous. However, a necessary precursor to the rectification of
rights is the rectification of names. As Confucius admonished,
rectification of names is the most important function of government.
Unless things are called by their proper names, they can neither be
understood nor properly dealt with.3 ° Our failure to do this has an
adverse effect on civic values and scientific judgments, and makes
31
legislation and subsequent court judgments unjust.
Such foundational questions are abstract and complex. They are
not amenable to thorough examination by our political system, which
tends to illuminate them by the diffused glow of aspirational statutes,
or by our legal institutions, which subjects them to the harsh spotlight
of litigated cases. Furthermore, underlying most environmental
conflicts is a lack of agreement on appropriate baselines. Whether one
focuses on the ecosphere as a whole, the flourishing of humankind, or
the liberty interests and level of environmental amenities inherent in
private ownership, alleged departures from the norm must be
measured from benchmarks, for which consensus must be obtained.

26 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926) (noting that
nuisance may be consulted "for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the
scope of, the [police] power" in land use regulation).
27 See, John Harte, Land Use, Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Integrity: The Challenge of
PreservingEarth'sLife Support System, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 929, 933 (2001).
28 Id.

29 Id. at 934-35.
30 CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS bk. XIII, at 171-72 (A. Waley trans. 1938) "If language is
incorrect, then what is said does not concord with what was meant; and if what is said does not
concord with what was meant, what is to be done cannot be effected." Id.
31 See Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory
Fluff'?, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 335, 350 (2006).

2008]

COMMON LAW

Adopting a neo-Kantian position, some environmentalists might
say that the environment has a value, not a price.32
Deep ecology is founded on two basic principles: one is a
scientific insight into the interrelatedness of all systems of life
on Earth, together with the idea that anthropocentrismhuman-centeredness-is a misguided way of seeing things.
Deep ecologists say that an ecocentric attitude is more
consistent with the truth about the nature of life on Earth.
Instead of regarding humans as something completely unique
or chosen by God, they see us as integral threads in the fabric
of life ....
The second component of deep ecology is... need for human
self-realization. Instead of identifying with our egos or our
immediate families, we would learn to identify with trees and
animals and plants, indeed the whole ecosphere .... 33
Along these lines, Professor Christopher Stone wrote in a well known
and provocative article, Should Trees Have Standing,34 that
environmental policy should be recast in biocentric rather than
anthropocentric terms, with natural objects being accorded legal
protection. "[U]ntil the rightless thing receives its rights, we cannot
see it as anything but a thing for the use of 'us'-those who are
holding rights at the time. 35 Stone also asserted that while
"repairable damage to the environment might be balanced and
36
weighed, irreparable damage could be enjoined absolutely.
While the deep ecologist's perspective might be that humans
simply are "integral threads in the fabric of life,"37 there is a more
broadly held perspective:
[A]n environmentalist's distaste for the materialistic ideals
that undergird the root causes of climate change does not
make attempting to thwart those ideals either practical or
32

See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 235

(Thomas E. Hill, Jr. & Amulf Zweig eds., Arnulf Zweig trans., 2002).
33 David Barnhizer, Walking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": the
Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 595, 614

n.49 (2006) (quoting Alan Atkisson, Introductionto Deep Ecology, IN CONTEXT, Summer 1989,
at 24, available at http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC22/Zimmrman.htm (Interview with Michael
E. Zimmerman)).
34 See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
35Id. at 455.
36 Id. at 485-86.
37 Barnhizer, supra note 33, at 614 n. 49.
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justified morally. Conspicuous consumption is deeply
entrenched in American self-conceptions, and in conceptions
of Americans by people in the developing world who want to
be like them.
[I]t is both unwise and counter-democratic to tell billions of
consumers that "We Know Better," and set about changing
deep structures without regard to the life-defining goals of
the consumers themselves. Such action is unwise because it
pins the biosphere's integrity on the hope of overcoming
something deeply ingrained in Western culture. And it is
counter-democratic because, until the members of that
culture change its constitutive forces, overcoming them in
the name of a paternalistic deep environmentalism thwarts
their clearly expressed preferences.3 8
Generally speaking, overarching environmental concerns seem
more amenable to the top-down imposition of categorical prohibitions
as positive law. Utilitarian balancing, on the other hand, is more
amenable to dealing with imperfect knowledge and heterogeneous
tastes for environmental goods through the bottom-up and flexible
approach of the common law.
Complicating the debate is that the imposition of stringent
environmental restrictions has vast consequences for the distribution
of wealth.39 In their consumptive activities, individuals seek different
amounts and types of environmental amenities, which sometimes are
in conflict. In their productive capacity, individuals often face
concentrated gains or losses, depending upon whether environmental
controls hinder or abet their work.
B. Environmentalism and "Eco-Pragmatism"
One might avoid utilitarian tests through the simple declaration
that protection of the ecology is not negotiable. Such categorical
proclamations are not unprecedented in American law. As a notable
example, the United States Code has maintained for almost a century
that human labor is not a commodity. 40 The Endangered Species Act
38 Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project, 17 STAN.
ENVTL. L. J. 73, 132-33 (1998).
39See LAZARUS, supra note 21, at 24-28. "What feeds much of what is controversial
about environmental law is . . . the enormous distributional conflicts unavoidable in the
establishment of a legal regime for environmental protection." Id. at 24.
4 Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (declaring that "the labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."). See generally, Horacio Spector,
PhilosophicalFoundationsof Labor Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1119, 1136-37 (2006).
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(ESA) 4 1 is the striking example of an environmental statute
propounding an absolute priority instead of a balancing test. It
provides that every federal agency "shall . . . insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in 42
the destruction or adverse modification
of habitat of such species ....
The ESA was upheld by the Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill,43 in which Chief Justice Warren Burger described
the ESA as "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation
4
of endangered species ever enacted by any nation."
It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively
small number of three-inch fish among all the countless
millions of species extant would require the permanent
halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has
expended more than $100 million. . . . We conclude,
however, that the explicit provisions 45 of the Endangered
Species Act require precisely that result.
[T]he plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative
history, shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of
endangered species as "incalculable." Quite obviously, it
would be difficult for a court to balance the loss of a sum
certain-even $100 million-against a congressionally
declared "incalculable" value, even assuming we had the
power to engage in such a weighing process, which we
emphatically do not.46
Even here, however, pragmatism prevailed in that the Tellico Dam
ultimately was placed in service.47 More generally, the ESA was
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et. seq.
Id. at § 1536 (a)(2) (emphasis added). The ESA regulations define "jeopardize" to mean
"to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by
reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
43 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
41
42

44

Id. at 180.

45 Id. at 172-73.
46 Id. at 187-88.
47 A midnight rider on an appropriations bill abrogated the ESA as it pertained to Tellico,
125 Cong. Rec. H1503, June 18, 1979; Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50. The Little Tennessee Valley was flooded in
November 1979. According to one account, President Jimmy Carter "anguished" over his
decision not to veto the rider, and called environmentalists "sheepishly to apologize." Zygmunt
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modified to provide for an "Endangered Species Committee,"
empowered to grant an exception after employing a balancing test,
albeit one weighted towards preservation.4 8
Despite (or perhaps because of) Chief Justice Burger's figurative
raised eyebrow, in an online national poll of environmental law
professors, nearly twice as many respondents selected TVA v. Hill as
one of the ten most important court cases in the history of
environmental law as voted for any other case.49
Alternatively, one could adopt a pragmatic approach towards the
environment. One notable example is Professor Daniel Farber's "ecopragmatism," which advocated an "environmental baseline" against
which public and private development activities could be measured.
As he advocates, "[t]o the extent feasible without incurring costs
grossly disproportionate to any benefit, the government should
eliminate significant environmental risks." 50 The book was attacked
as articulating a "wobbly" theory lacking in structural coherence,
permitting Farber "to overestimate the social consensus behind his
own preferred outcomes, so that he never articulates or responds to
views that are foreign to his environmental parade."'"
Even where environmental law seems to focus on the protection of
a natural system purely for the sake of that natural system-as in the
protection of an endangered species where there is no known or likely
utilitarian benefit to humans-in most cases pragmatic political
advocacy of such natural protections must seek and emphasize
linkages to human welfare. 2 The federal appointment of a "God
Squad" to remove species from the protection of the Endangered
Species Act suggests an intermediate, "eco-pragmatic" approach.53

J.B. Plater, EndangeredSpecies Act Lessons Over 30 Years, And the Legacy of the Snail Darter,
a Small Fish in a Pork Barrel,34 ENVTL. L. 289, 294 n. 15 (2004).
48 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (2000). See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
49 Plater, supra note 47, at 294 n.17 (citing poll by American University law professor
James Salzman).
50 DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM:
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 131 (1999).

MAKING

SENSIBLE

ENVIRONMENTAL

51 Richard A. Epstein, Too Pragmatic by Half 109 YALE L.J. 1639, 1641-42 (2000)
(book review).
52See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the EndangeredSpecies ActA Noah Presumptionand Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in the Coalmine,,
27 ENVTL. L. 845, 852-53 (1997) ("The ESA is clearly stronger if it is publicly recognized to
fulfill significant utilitarianfunctions...") (emphasis in original).
53 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Is the EndangeredSpecies Act Eco-pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV.
885, 913-14 (2003). In this article, Ruhl discusses the provision added to the ESA in 1978
permitting an Endangered Species Committee (commonly known as the "God Squad") to
remove protection where there are "no reasonable alternatives to the proposed action, the
benefits of the proposed action clearly outweigh the benefits of avoiding jeopardy, and the
action is of regional or national significance." Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)). This
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It is easy for positive law increasingly to encroach upon the
common law, and for a process of regulatory accretion to add binding
operational prescriptions to what were largely aspirational statutes. 4
However, problems of regulatory complexity are not appreciably
different from problems of environmental complexity.
System burdens arise from the collective operation of rules.
Drawing from complex systems theory-the study of large
systems of dynamically related agents-we explain how
regulatory systems exhibit behaviors such as feedback,
emergence, path dependence, and nonlinearity, all of which
simultaneously produce overall system resilience and locally
unpredictable and unstable outcomes in system behavior.
Accretion of a complex system's agents can amplify these
system properties, changing the underlying character of the
system itself. It is these qualitative effects on system
behavior, principally local unpredictability and instability,
which we equate
with system burdens on compliance with
55
regulatory law.
Not only are rules apt to induce instability, but even rules and
management practices designed to reduce instability add to instability.
As noted in one article on ecosystem stress, "[m]anagement strategies
which are directed toward smoothing out marked oscillations in
ecosystem behavior which are normal to the long-term maintenance
of the system are themselves stressful. 5 6
C. Defining EnvironmentalLaw
Pondering the meaning of "the environment" leads to
consideration of the nature of environmental law. Professor Dan
Tarlock has challenged us to ask what he termed the "Gertrude Stein
7
question":5

procedure has succeeded very infrequently. Id. at 914. (citing Patrick A. Parenteau, The
Exemption Process and the "God Squad, " in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND

PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur & William Robert Irvin eds., 2002)).
m See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003).
55 Id. at 763.
56D. J. Rapport, et al., Ecosystem Behavior Under Stress, 125 AM. NATURALIST 617, 626
(1985).
57 A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 213-15 (2004). According to Tarlock, the complete quotation on which his title is
premised is: "[W]hat was the use of my having come from Oakland it was not natural to have
come from there yes write about it if I like or anything if I like but not there, there is no there
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Environmental law's rapid rise and great success .
postponed consideration of the hard questions about the
content and legitimacy of the field and environmental
protection generally. The relative neglect of these difficult
problems is neither surprising nor unknown. It is, however,
troubling. The neglect of content and legitimacy is not
surprising because environmental law, as we understand it, is
still an infant area of the law. Environmental law grew so
rapidly and quickly that there was no time, or need, to worry
about its jurisprudential underpinnings. It enjoyed the luxury
of skipping the stages of debate over fundamentals and
incremental growth and acceptance. Debates went directly to
the important, but narrower, question about the merits of the
suite of policy instruments available to achieve the
Congressional protection objectives. This "papering over" has
not gone unnoticed. Over the years, many have observed that
the impressive formal superstructure of environmental law
masks the persistent doubts about the existence of a "there" in
environmental law, but the continued stream of law, cases,
and regulations pushed these concerns to the background.
However, as environmental law continues to mature, the
largely neglected questions of content and legitimacy become
more troubling
and need to be addressed if the area is to
58
sustain itself.
This lack of a central core might explain why, as Professor Joseph
Sax ruefully noted, the study of environmental law inevitably leads to
statutes of "numbing complexity and detail."'5 9
D. Is Environmentalism Based on Ethics or Science?
For most of the twentieth century, the reigning view of ecology
was the "equilibrium paradigm," which viewed nature as a system in
balance.60 It was summed up in Aldo Leopold's land ethic. "A thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of

there." Id.
at 214 n. I (quoting GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937).
58Id. at 216-17 (footnotes omitted).
59Joseph L. Sax, EnvironmentalLaw in the Law Schools: What We Teach and How We
FeelAbout It, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10251 (1989).
60 E.g., Julie Thrower, Comment, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a
Nonequilibrium View of Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871, 874

(2006).
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6
the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." '
Leopold's ecological conscience was rooted in biocentric equality, the
idea that "man is, in fact, only a member
2 of a biotic team, as shown
history."6
of
interpretation
ecological
by
Leopold's notion that everything is connected to everything else is
similar to the view of another pioneer environmentalist, John Muir:
"[w]hen we try to pick out anything
by itself, we fmd it hitched to
63
everything else in the universe.,
It was in this framework that environmental law developed. "Just
as ecology focused on the adverse consequences of human activity,
environmental law focused on preserving and protecting the
underlying equilibrium of nature from human disturbance in order to
prevent ecological transformation. ' 64
By the 1990s, however, it had become clear that this was not the
case. In 1992, ecological pioneer Eugene Odum listed as his first
concept in ecology that "[a]n ecosystem
is a thermodynamically open,
65
system.
equilibrium,
from
far
Professor Dan Tarlock noted that "[l]egislatures and lawyers
enthusiastically embraced [the equilibrium] paradigm because it
seemed to be a neutral universal organizing principle potentially
applicable to the use and management of all natural resources. 66
Such statutes as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,67 the
Endangered Species Act of 1973,68 and parts
of the Clean Water
70
Act, 69 including section 404, are based upon it.

Twenty-five years after this paradigm was incorporated into
law, it-and thus the basis for the core of biodiversity
protection law-is now unraveling. In the twenty-five years
since it has been enshrined in environmental law, the
61
62
63

ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 224-25 (1949).
Id. at 241.
JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 211 (1911).

6 See Thrower, supra note 60, at 875. Thus "contemporary ecological research
demonstrates that nature continually changes both in response to internal processes, such as
chemical cycling, and external pressures, such as climate. Ecological systems are dynamic
entities that are constantly changing. Lakshman Guruswamy, Integration & Biocomplexity, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1191, 1205-06 (2001).
65 Eugene P. Odum, Great Ideas in Ecology for the 1990s, 42 BIOSCIENCE 542, 542

(1992).
66 A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigmin Ecology and the PartialUnraveling
ofEnvironmentalLaw, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1121, 1122 (1994).
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (2000).
- 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
69 Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§
1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993)).
70 Tarlock, supra note 66, at 1122-23.
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equilibrium paradigm has been rejected in ecology and
replaced with a complex, stochastic nonequilibrium one. 7'
As Tarlock subsequently added, there is a "tendency to respond to
the contingencies and uncertainties inherent in environmental science
by reclassifying problems as ethical rather than scientific."7 2 He
argued that the displacement of the equilibrium paradigm with the
nonequilibrium model would require a corresponding conversion
from the preservationist "simple nature veneration ethic" to "a
combination of strategies which seek the maintenance of dynamic
healthy ecosystems, ecosystem restoration and the increased use of
adaptive management., 73 In particular, Tarlock urged that science
alone could establish the necessary conditions for legitimate
environmentalism, that we should resist the tendency to respond to
the uncertainties inherent in science by reclassifying problems as
ethical rather than scientific, and that we should avoid grounding
74
environmental law in "non-anthropocentric 'rights of nature."'
However, some scholars, reminiscent of Professor Bruce
Ackerman's concept of "constitutional moments, 75 have stressed the
importance of promulgating environmental mandates "in the heat of
widespread political interest." 76 As noted by Donald T. Hornstein,
"[p]revailing sentiment formed during such times not only represents
collective preferences which are democratically legitimate, but also
collective preferences which tend to reflect the qualitative attributes
risk that are poorly captured by scientific risk
of environmental
77
assessments. ,
II. THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN LIBERTY
A. Liberty and Human Flourishing
The basic premise of mainstream environmentalism and
environmental law is that human flourishing can occur only in the

Id. at 1123.
72A. Dan Tarlock, EnvironmentalLaw: Ethics or Science?, 7 DUKE ENrVTL. L. & POL'Y
F. 193, 196 (1996) (noting that the shift from science to ethics is traced in CHARLES T. RUBIN,
71

THE GREEN CRUSADE: RETHINKING THE ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1994)).
73 Id. at 194.

74Id. at 196.
75 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992).

76Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from FederalPesticide Regulation on the Paradigmsand
PoliticsofEnvironmentalLaw Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 440 (1993).
77Id.
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context of a healthy ecosystem. Environmental law protects against
"ecological impacts that threaten public health and biodiversity. 78
Professor Richard Lazarus noted that the burst of environmental
legislation in the 1970s did not arise in a vacuum, but rather followed
from many earlier developments. 79 He attributed much of the change
in public perception to the increasingly broad and rapid transmission
of information about environmental threats that gave people a sense
that the environment was more fragile than they had thought and to
the public's increasing awareness of the Earth as a single entitystoked especially by the emotional impact of seeing the first pictures
of the planet from space.8 °
On the other hand, as Professor Barton Thompson observed,
conservatives of varying stripes have been somewhat wary of the
environmentalist movement.
Libertarians emphasize individual liberty from governmental
interference and from pollution and other forms of
nonconsensual harm. Economic conservatives... believe that
government should pursue those policies, including
environmental policies, that are efficient in maximizing the
overall economic welfare of society. "Jeffersonian
Conservatives" endorse the devolution of governmental
authority, including environmental regulation, to state and
local governments. "Hamiltonian Conservatives," by contrast,
advocatenational authority, used to support economic
development and growth, and thus may disfavor
environmental regulation that impedes economic markets.
Finally, "Burkean Conservatives" may favor environmental
protection but insist upon firm scientific support for new
regulations and distrust dramatic shifts in policy. 81
One strand of conservatism explicitly omitted from Thompson's
analysis is religious conservatism, since he regarded the attitudes of
adherents as unclear. 82 One source of resistance is the fear that
83
environmentalism is not compatible with traditional religious belief.
78 LAZARUS, supranote 21, at 1.
79 Id. at 49 (citing, inter alia, the creation of national parks, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act

of 1918, the National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of 1966).
80 Id. at 55-56.
S Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservative Economic Thought: The Bush Administration
and EnvironmentalPolicy, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 312-13 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
82

Id. at 312 n.16.

83 See, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, Environmental Religion: A Theological Critique, 55 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 51, 51 (2004) ("Environmentalism is a type of modem religion."). Nelson
highlighted the statement of a leading environmental law scholar that "he and fellow
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However, some fundamentalist Protestant groups recently have taken
up environmental concerns. 84
Another important fault line in American perceptions is whether
environmental amenities are associated with negative or positive
liberty. As described by Isaiah Berlin, "negative" liberty is the right
of individuals to pursue their chosen activities free from external
social interference by others.8 5 The concept of negative liberty often
is associated with John Stuart Mill, who declared that "[t]here is a
limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with
individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human
affairs, as protection against political despotism.' 86 Correspondingly,
"positive" liberty consists of the entitlement to social conditions
allowing for the effective exercise of an individual's judgment and
choice in providing direction to his or her life.87 In the American legal
system, which is predisposed to individual rights,88 property is
protected under the Takings 89 and Contract Clauses, 90 but the
provision of goods, such as access to housing, generally is not
regarded as a fundamental right. 91 To be sure, individuals often
possess "entitlements," which are affirmative benefits provided by
statute and cognizable by the courts. However, entitlements generally
are subject to termination or the imposition of future conditions by the
legislature.9 2 In short, "the Constitution is a charter of negative rather

preservationists were 'secular prophets, preaching a message of secular salvation."' Id. at 51
(quoting JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL
PARKS 104 (1980)).
8 See, e.g., National Association of Evangelicals, Evangelical, Scientific Leaders Launch
Effort to Protect Creation (January 17, 2007) (noting the "Urgent Call to Action" issued by 28
religious leaders and scientists concerned about "habitat destruction, pollution, species
extinction, the spread of human infectious diseases, and other dangers to the well-being of
societies." Available at http://www.nae.net/index.cfm?FUSEACTION=editor.page&pagelD=
413&tDcategory-l (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
85 ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). A
more general formulation poses the question: "Is x is free from y to do z." See Gerald C.
MacCallum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312, 314 (1967).
86 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM: ON LIBERTY; ESSAY ON BENTHAM
126, 130 (Mary Warnock ed., New American Library 1962) (1859).
87 Id. at 130-31.
88 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
89 U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
90 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl.1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts ....).
91See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("We are unable to perceive ... any
constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality...").
92 See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (holding Social Security benefits
not an accrued property right).
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than positive liberties. The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not
concerned that government might
do too little for the people but that
93
it might do too much to them.,
To the extent that environmental amenities are deemed to be
property, they are protected by the common law of nuisance. To the
extent that the benefit of environmental amenities is created by
statute, citizens often have standing to bring lawsuits to protect
94
them.
B. Competition, Coordination,andHuman Nature
In his seminal article Toward a Theory of Property Rights,95
economist Harold Demsetz discussed how individuals could best
regulate their exploitation of scarce resources for the general good.
He noted that common property would be an inexpensive solution,
with the problem of endless negotiations and vice of overuse. The
creation of private property rights in resources would internalize the
costs of over-exploitation. However, creating, monitoring, and
policing property rights are themselves quite expensive. Demsetz
concluded that "property rights arise when it becomes economic
for
96
those affected by externalities to internalize benefits and costs.
Garrett Harden subsequently made much the same point in his
celebrated article The Tragedy of the Commons,97 which laments the
fact that the payoff for individuals defecting from the common good
exceeds the benefits from cooperation, although cooperation would be
of collective benefit to all. As he notes, "[r]uin is the destination
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. 98 Hardin
regarded human population growth as a fundamental environmental
problem, and declaimed "the necessity of abandoning the freedom to

93 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
94

See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412

U.S. 669, 686-88 (1973) (granting standing). The Supreme Court noted the "irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing" as "the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' ...
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of ... [and]
must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a
favorable decision."' Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations
omitted). However, compare, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102
(1998) (denying standing); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (denying standing).
91 Harold Demsetz, Towarda Theory of Property Rights," 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &

PROC.) 347 (1967).
96 Id. at 354.
97 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
99 Id. at 1244.
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breed." 99 He advocated "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon," as
the means of cutting the Gordian knot.' 00
The rub, as Professor James Krier noted, is that a society capable
of achieving consensus on coercing its members into cooperation is a
society that can cooperate without coercion.' 0 ' Krier's concerns about
what he called "question begging" were not limited to the left. He
property rights and cooperation within
deemed advocates of private
10 2
markets guilty as well.
Debates in the United States on legal and policy aspects of the
environment generally are cast in terms of real property rights versus
environmental regulation. However, the "mutual coercion" advocated
by Hardin need not lead to the regulatory expropriation feared by
property rights advocates. Although environmental regulation is the
scene of intense disputes wherein some actors try to deflect costs
away from themselves and inflict them on others, broad-based
measures such as Pigovian carbon taxes might supply part of the
answer. However, "a Pigovian model of government... assumes that
government is an unimpeachable benefit-cost machine." 10 3 Also, it is
such taxes 10 4 and to harmonize with international
difficult to 0calibrate
5
trade laws
Assuming that property rights must be limited to help achieve
environmental goals, fairness would indicate that the costs be
imposed broadly upon those who benefit. The Supreme Court
recently affirmed its emphasis on this value.' 6 The fact that taxes are
broad based, and arrogations of specific property are not, is what
makes only the latter compensable.'0 7 The lack of political will to
impose broad taxes to meet environmental demands both supports
Professor Krier's point and indicates the strength of the temptation to
99 Id. at 1248.

0i01d. at 1247.
101See, e.g., James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 325, 337 (1992).

1021d. at 339-346. See supra text accompanying notes 162-164.
103 William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments
on Economic Interpretationsof "Just Compensation"Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 285 (1988).
104See Johan Albrecht, The Use of Consumption Taxes to Re-Launch Green Tax Reforms,
26 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 88 (2006).
05

1 See Richard J. King, Regional Trade and the Environment: EuropeanLessons for North

America, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 209 (1996).
106Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) ("While scholars have offered
various justifications for this regime, we have emphasized its role in 'bar[ring] Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be bome by the public as a whole."') (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)).
1O7See Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous
Burdens Principle, and its Broader Applications, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189 (2002); Eduardo
Moisfs Peflalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182 (2004).
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impose the cost of environmental remediation
upon individual
08
landowners and other targets of opportunity.1
C. Subsidiarity,Federalism and the Environment
The concept of subsidiarity is important to devising rules for the
solution of environmental problems. Until its emergence in American
political discourse in the 1990s, familiarity with the subsidiarity
principle largely was limited to Catholic social theorists and observers
of the European Union. 10 9 While "subsidiarity" usually is employed
with respect to the relative competence of competing institutions to
deal with social problems," 1 the seminal text makes it clear that, in a
fundamental sense, all institutions are subsidiary:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they
can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give
it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same
time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a
greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate
organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its
very nature to furnish help to the members of the body social,
and never destroy and absorb them.'
In the United States, discussion of subsidiarity often is manifested
in the rhetoric of federalism. Likewise, in some States, it is
manifested in discussion of the devolution of power under "home
rule" charter provisions, although States typically maintain
centralized control." 2 Subsidiarity should not be confused with
citizen consultation. The latter has been recognized as important, both
08

1 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
109Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principleof Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35

IND. L. REv. 103, 103 (2001).
"Old. (noting that when "families, neighborhoods, churches, or community groups can
effectively address a given problem, they should. Where they cannot, municipal or state
governments should intervene. Only when the lower bodies prove ineffective should the federal
government become involved.").
I Peter Widulski, Bakke, Grutter, and the Principleof Subsidiarity,32 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 847, 847 (2005) (quoting Pius XI, Quadragesimoanno, § 79 (1931), and noting Pope Pius'

statement that the principle of subsidiarity "remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy").
11
2 More commonly, municipal corporations possess only those powers provided them by
the state constitution and legislature using a narrow interpretation known as "Dillon's Rule."
See JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-55 (5th

ed. 1911). Some three-quarters of the States still utilize this interpretive rule to limit some or all
types of local decisionmaking. See Chad D. Emerson, Making Main Street Legal Again: The

SmartCode Solution to Sprawl, 71 Mo. L. REv. 637, 680 n. 249 (2006) (citing Jesse J.
Richardson, Jr. et al., Is Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying the Influence of Dillon's Rule on

Growth Management 17-18 (Brookings Inst. on Urb. & Metro. Pol'y, Working Paper, 2003),
availableat http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/dillonsrule.pdf
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"as a way to increase government legitimacy and to address some of
3
these perceived flaws in the operation of the administrative state.""
Indeed, it has been asserted that, during the past generation, "courts,
Congress, and scholars have elevated participation to a sacrosanct
status."' 14 The trend towards increased consultation exists as well at
the international level. For instance, the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development states that "[e]nvironmental issues are
best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the
relevant level," and that "States shall facilitate and encourage public
awareness and participation by making information widely
available ....
15
While consultation involves input into decisionmaking,
subsidiarity involves devolution, or a respectful deference, in the
making of decisions by the individuals or groups composing larger
entities. In the international sphere, decisions may be kept in the
hands of the nation state instead of the international entity. Similarly,
federalism provides that national governance yield to regional
govemance, and home rule provides that regional governance yield to
local governance. The epitome of subsidiarity is that governments of
all kinds yield to the decisionmaking autonomy of individuals.
Subsidiarity, referring to local government, or, in the case of the
European Union, national government, furthers self-determination
and accountability, political liberty, flexibility, preservation of
identities, and diversity. 16 These factors are just as applicable to
decisions being made at the individual level, such as decisions to
assert common law environmental rights.
Concerns about the environment and subsidiarity have grown in
recent decades in the United States, reflecting the growing
assertiveness of both Congress and the federal courts in this area. In
recent decades, so-called "institutional lawsuits" have resulted in
"institutional decrees" by which federal courts have come to
administer, among other agencies, state mental health and prison
systems and local school districts.' I7 The scope of such remedial
action has raised questions about "whether the judiciary has begun to
13

1 David L. Markell,

Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision

Making Processesas a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 653 (2006).
114Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs of Mass Participationfor Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking,92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 174-75 (1997).
15Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 10, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
874. 116
George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUtM. L. REv. 331, 340-41 (1994).

111Paul J. Mishkin, FederalCourts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 949
(1978).
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that would never be tolerated
tolerate in itself a blending of functions
' "18
government."
of
branch
in another
During the past forty years, Congress has legislated a large array
of social legislation, establishing new responsibilities for environment
protection and public health, entitlements to them, and means to
enforce them. Notable among them are the Motor Vehicle Pollution
Control Act of 1965,119 the Air Quality Act of 1967,120 and the Clean
Air Act Amendments in 1990.121 In addition, Congress has centralized

powers in new federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection
policy and to enforce those policies
Agency, to make environmental
22
through rulemaking. 1

While Congress has reserved a substantial role for states in most
environmental statutes, particularly pertaining to the implementation
and enforcement of federal standards, Congress has kept most of the
fundamental policy-making authority for itself or the federal
agencies. 123 The proliferation of federal statutes has been
accompanied by increased federal spending for regulatory programs,
on federal funding to help
and many states have become dependent
124
run their own environmental programs.
1 25
Subsidiarity has its adherents in the field of environmental law.
It also is instructive to note that, while the effect of sweeping federal
judicial decrees on federalism has troubled commentators, 126 there is

8
Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of FederalEquitable Remedies,
11

30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 661 (1978).
119Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000).
20
1 Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000).
121Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2000).
122President Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency by Executive Order in
1970. 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1970) (Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970. Other new agencies included
the Office of Surface Mining, the Office of Coastal Zone Management, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the Natural Resources
of the Justice Department).
Division
123
See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Illusion of Devolution in Environmental Law, 38 URB.
LAW. 1003 (2006).
124John P. Dwyer, The Practiceof Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV.
1183, 1185 (1995).
125See James L. Huffman, The Past and Future of EnvironmentalLaw, 30 ENVTL. L. 23,
31 (2000) (observing that, in environmental matters, "[p]erhaps Americans are moving toward
the regulatory philosophy of subsidiarity-the principle that the best government is that which is
the least centralized yet still adequate to accomplish the task at hand"); Wallace E. Oates, On
Environmental Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (1997) (arguing that opposition to
decentralized environmental regulation "represents a fundamental inconsistency with the basic
principle of subsidiarity to which the European Community has subscribed").
126See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 117, at 964-65; Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers
and the Scope of FederalEquitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 674-75 (1978). But see,
William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 637, 644-45 (1982).
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evidence indicating that courts, including the Supreme Court, ' "can
27
almost never be effective producers of significant social reform."'
Another reason for increased subsidiarity in the United States,
including the rectification of environmental harms under common law
nuisance, is that the Constitutional basis for federal environmental
regulation is weak. Professor Richard Lazarus, a strong supporter of
28
environmental legislation, candidly admits that the Property Clause
provides Congress plenary authority, but only on federal30 land, and
29
that the Spending Clause1 is limited to the federal purse.
At least in recent history, the only clause susceptible to a
broader reading has been the Constitution's Commerce
Clause (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3), which authorizes Congress to
regulate interstate commerce. An expansive reading of that
clause authorizes federal legislation for environmental
protection based on the theory that activities adversely
affecting the environment have substantial effects on
interstate commerce. The vast majority of modem federal
environmental legislation is based on just such a reading of
the Commerce Clause and has, to date, been upheld by the
courts when challenged. The fit is nonetheless theoretically
uneasy. The rhetoric of the Commerce Clause itself suggests
the problem: it makes congressional control dependent on a
commercial nexus. Commerce possessing a substantial
interstate dimension is what the Constitution isolates as being
of sufficient national interest to warrant the exercise of
federal authority. The problem for environmental protection
lawmaking is that, although commerce is certainly of central
relevance to environmental protection, it is not ultimately that
area of law's central concern.
To base the validity of federal lawmaking authority for
environmental protection on a commercial nexus invariably
invites the creation of tortured legal arguments and legal
fictions.
131

127
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? 338 (1991) (noting also that "[a] court's contribution . . . is akin to officially
recognizing the evolving state of affairs, more like the cutting of the ribbon on a new project
than its construction.") (emphasis in original).
128U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2.
129Id. at art. 1,§ 8, cl. 1.
130LAZARUS, supra note 21, at 36-37.
131
Id. at 37.
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The original meaning of "commerce" under the Commerce Clause
32
related narrowly to exchange, and did not include fabrication.
Likewise, the Necessary and Proper Clause was not infinitely
expandable, but rather took a middle position between "absolute
necessity" and "convenience.' 33
In Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton,134 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) decision to block construction of a 202-acre housing
development in San Diego County. The court found the FWS decision
consistent with the Commerce Clause, although the arroyo
southwestern toad, which it was intended to protect, never travels
outside California. After noting that, without the Commerce Clause
limitation, "Government could regulate as a take any kind of
activity,"' 35 Chief Judge Douglas Ginsburg concurred on the ground
was affected due to the large-scale nature of
that interstate commerce
36
the development. 1
In GDF Realty Investment, Ltd. v. Norton,137 the Fifth Circuit
upheld the application of the Endangered Species Act to six species of
subterranean invertebrates found only within two counties in Texas
(Cave Species). The court conceded that, "in a sense, Cave Species
takes are neither economic nor commercial. There is no market for
them; any future market is conjecture.' 38 Even though there was no
explicit link to commerce, the court aggregated takes of Cave Species
with all takes of all endangered species because. Its rationale was that
the Cave Species takes were part of a larger regulation that was
"directed at activity that is economic in nature" and because the
regulated intrastate activity (Cave Species takes) was an "essential
part of the economic regulatory scheme.' 3 9
Judge Edith Jones, joined by five others, dissented from the denial
of rehearing en banc and accused the panel of140 "craft[ing] a
constitutionally limitless theory of federal protection.'
132 See Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of "Commerce" in the Commerce Clause,
80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 789 (2006).
133
See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and ProperClause, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 208-14 (2003).
134
323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
135
Id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
1361d. (noting the large scope of the proposed development, but adding that "[just as
important, however, the lone hiker in the woods, or the homeowner who moves dirt in order to
landscape his property, though he takes the toad, does not affect interstate commerce").
137326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
131
Id.at 638.
13'
Id.at 639.
14OGDF Realty Investment, Ltd. v. Norton (GDF II), 362 F.3d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 2004)
dissenting).
(Jones, J.,
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The panel holds that because "takes" of the Cave Species
ultimately threaten the "inter-dependent web" of all species,
their habitat is subject to federal regulation by the
Endangered Species Act. Such unsubstantiated reasoning
offers but a remote, speculative, attenuated, indeed more than
improbable connection to interstate commerce. Chief Justice
Marshall stated in Cohens v. Virginia that Congress has no
general right to punish murder or felonies generally. Surely,
though, there is more force to an "interdependence" analysis
concerning humans, and thus a more obvious series of links
to interstate commerce, than there is to "species." Yet the
panel's "interdependent web" analysis of the Endangered
Species Act gives these subterranean bugs federal protection
that was denied the41school children in Lopez and the rape
victim in Morrison.1
The problem is that John Muir's observation that "[w]hen we try to
pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the
universe ' 42 applies equally to the Commerce Clause. But the fact that
environmental restrictions affect landowners development rights, and
that this has a subsequent effect on commerce, does not mean that the
regulation had any particular connection with commerce.
Since GDF Realty, the Supreme Court has retreated from its
landmark federalism decisions that gave rise to the disparity cited by
Judge Jones.143 Notably, in Gonzales v. Raich,144 the Court held that
intrastate production and use of marijuana could "undercut" federal
efforts to regulate the interstate market and thus could be banned
by
45
Congress under the principle enunciated in Wickard v. Filburn1
D. EnvironmentalRegulation and Wealth Redistribution
Environmentalists and property rights supporters alike agree that
the nature of environmental injuries and the degree of scientific
certainty regarding their probability are only part of the explanation
141
Id. (citing Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)).
42

1 JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 211 (1911).

143See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (2000) (striking down federal statute
criminalizing possession of firearm in vicinity of school absent showing that gun was in
interstate commerce); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (deeming civil remedy
provisions of federal Violence Against Women Act insufficiently related to interstate
commerce).
l- 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding federal criminalization of possession of marijuana grown
and used in Califomia for medical purposes pursuant to state law).
145317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that Congress could regulate the production and use
of wheat on an individual farm because the aggregate of such uses "exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce.").
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for why environmental law is so controversial. "What feeds much of
what is controversial about environmental law is instead the
enormous distributional conflicts unavoidable in the establishment of
a legal regime for environmental protection.' ' 146 More generally with
regard to environmental matters, a society is a "cooperative venture
for mutual advantage" where interests coincide and an "arena of
conflict" where they do not.' 47 Inevitably, the benefits of
environmental regulation will inure to those whose spatial, temporal,
and vocational situations differ from those bearing the costs, and who
may have different recreational preferences, ethical values, and
susceptibility to environmental harms, as well.
The potential imposition of high costs upon their members may
lead business groups to oppose specific regulations.1 48 From another
perspective, advocates of "environmental justice" have argued that
"the geographic distribution of air and water pollutants, toxic waste
sites, and other health and safety hazards is unfair to racial and lowincome groups, and that
risk regulation should be structured to
' 49
eliminate this inequity.'
Just as environmental costs might be imposed on others by those
seeking to avoid the expense of desirable environmental regulation,
costs likewise might be imposed on others for the benefit of those
seeking unwarranted environmental regulation. Environmental group
leaders might engage in behavior inconsistent with their stated
environmental goals, including self-dealing by insiders and alliances
with groups possessing 50desiring what might be deemed antienvironmental outcomes. 1
While it is conventional to ascribe different motives to businesses
and "not for profit" organizations, public choice theory, which studies

46

1 LAzARuS, supra note 21, at 24.
147NICHOLAS MERCURO ET AL., ECOLOGY, LAW AND ECONOMICS 77 (1994).

148See George B. Wyeth, "Standard" and "Alternative" EnvironmentalProtection: The
Changing Role of Environmental Agencies, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 5, 9

(2006) (asserting that, under the "standard" model, "business goals and environmental goals
[are] conflicting," "relations between government and business are primarily adversarial," and
"failing to exploit a resource whose cost could be externalized could be fatal to the
corporation").
149
Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk
Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1424 (2003).
150See, e.g., David B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, Nonprofit Land Bank Amasses Billions;
Charity Builds Assets on Corporate Partnerships,WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at Al ("The
Arlington-based Nature Conservancy has blossomed into the world's richest environmental
group, amassing S 3 billion in assets by pledging to save precious places. . . . Yet the
Conservancy has logged forests, engineered a $ 64 million deal paving the way for opulent
houses on fragile grasslands and drilled for natural gas under the last breeding ground of an
endangered bird species.").
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political processes through economic analysis,' 5 ' suggests that this
view is not accurate.
The economic (or "interest group") theory of law, concludes that
"legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so
that legislative protection flows to those groups that derive the
greatest value from it, regardless of overall social welfare.' 52 Under
the interest group theory of lawmaking, individuals and groups will
form alliances and coalitions in order to trade resources, which
include power, influence, and money. "[M]arket forces provide strong
incentives for politicians to enact laws that serve private rather than
public interests, and hence statutes are supplied by lawmakers
to the
53
political groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups."'
A quarter-century ago, Professor Bruce Yandle memorably
described how self-interest makes for unlikely bedfellows in "Baptists
and Bootleggers."' 5 4 His parable described how bootleggers
financially contributed to Southern Baptist campaigns for Sunday
blue laws in Southern states, since that would give them a one-dayper-week monopoly on the sale of liquor. Yandle subsequently argued
that some industries, or firms within an industry, would play the role
of "bootleggers" by contributing to environmental groups. The
environmentalists, in turn, played the rule of "Baptists," advocating
environmental55 regulations that would harm the "bootleggers"
competitors. 1
Yandle's thesis was tested by Professor Todd Zywicki, whose
empirical study indicated that environmental "public interest"
56
organizations acted inconsistently with a public interest model.
'1 The seminal works of public choice theory include KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY (1957); and JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, The Calculus of Consent in

PHILOSOPHY
AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Thomas Christiano, ed., 2003).
152 Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution,49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982).
15Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 (1986).
154Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist,
REGULATION, May-June 1983, at 12, 13-14.
155BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: TRACKING
THE UNICORN 19-39 (1989).

156
Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of EnvironmentalInterest Groups,
53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315 (2002). Zywicki "evaluated the behavior of environmental
interest groups in order to test the public interest model in explaining the behavior of
environmental interest groups. Although the examination has been more impressionistic than
scientific, the model has not fared well. The public interest model suggests at least three tests of
its validity in this conteflt: (1) basing policy on the best-available science, (2) engaging in goodfaith public deliberation over social and economic priorities, and (3) willingness to consider
alternative means to accomplish desired environmental goals. The actual behavior of
environmental interest groups is not consistent with any of these tests, casting doubt on the

20081

COMMONLAW

Zywicki then considered the conduct of the environmental groups
using a public choice model, and concluded: "Political
environmentalism, then, can probably be most fruitfully understood
as an effort for environmentalists to secure benefits for themselves,
and, through
the political process, and to force others to pay for
, 157
them."
III. COMMON LAW STANDARDS AND STATUTORY RULES

Much of the pressure for the adoption of statutory rules for
environmental protection stems from the view that the common law,
bottom up, system of enforcing individual property rights in
environmental amenities is inadequate. According to Dean Huffman,
"[t]he idea of free market environmentalism is particularly distressing
for orthodox environmentalists, because for them it is
environmentally correct to believe that markets and the wealth they
produce are
the source of many, if not most, environmental
' 158
problems."
Terry Anderson and Donald Leal have asserted that there is
nothing about environmental goals that makes them less amenable to
the working of markets than other desirable amenities and goods. 59
Imperfections in markets do not necessarily mean that an alternative
system is better.' 60 Free market environmentalism has been extolled
as substituting for "[p]opulist sentiment and pork-barrel politics" a
"system of private ownership [that] would protect the environment for
the same reason that it protects
other kinds of property: because it
'' 6 1
stewardship.
good
encourages
Professor James Krier has countered that free market
environmentalism is about markets, and that in the context of
economics, "[n]othing is free, whether a lunch or a market, so free
market environmentalism is, if not a moronic idea, at least an

validity of the public interest model as a valid explanation of the behavior of environmental
activist groups." Id. at 334-35.
151
Id. at 349.
158James L. Huffman, Protecting the Environment From Orthodox Environmentalism, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 349, 349 (1992).
59
1 See generally, TERRY L. ANDERSON
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991).

&

DONALD

R. LEAL,

FREE

MARKET

160See Emery N. Castle, The Market Mechanism, Externalities,and Land Economics, 47 J.
FARM ECON. 542, 552 (1965) (asserting that "[m]arket 'failure' in some abstract sense does not
mean that a nonmarket [governmental] alternative will not also fail in the same or in some other
abstract sense").
161Richard L. Stroup & Jane S. Shaw, The Free Market and the Environment, PUBLIC
INT.EREST, Fall 1989, at 30, 31.
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oxymoron."' 62 He claims that Anderson and Leal, and, by extension,
other free market environmentalist writers, "beg the problem of
coordination and forego any effort at serious comparative analysis" of
the flaws and relative coordination problems of government and
market actors.163 Even if allegations of government inefficiency and
furtherance of bureaucratic welfare are correct, "[w]hy will the
government not fail in setting up and overseeing the new natural
resource markets, just as it fails, and for the same reasons, in setting
up and overseeing regulatory programs?"' 64
However, free market environmentalists like Anderson and Leal
regard the use of market mechanisms within a system of government
controls as decidedly second-best ,165 and eschew the creation of the
"regulatory property" that subsequently is traded. 66 Given their view
that the State should be limited to enforcement of the common law of
property, contract, tort, and crimes, they cannot be answerable for
defects in the regulatory process.
A. The Purported "Disintegration"of Property
Two important elements in the supplanting of common law
property rules by comprehensive environmental statutes are academic
arguments that property claims are indeterminate and that "property"
itself is not a useful construct.
In 1932, A.C. Pigou published his The Economics of Welfare,
which perceived the activities of others that adversely impinged upon
the reasonable enjoyment of a given owner's property as bad
externalities. 67 While such negative externalities could be could be
enjoined by courts in response to private or public nuisance actions,
Pigou argued that they could be discouraged wholesale through
offsetting ("Pigovian") taxes.
Pigou's analysis later was dethroned by Professors James
Buchanan and William Stubblebine, 168 who found externalities only
62

1 Krier, supra note 101, at 332.
163 Id. at

341.
1641d. at 341-42.
165ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 159, at 158 (noting that Clean Air Act tradable permits
"do not represent a truly free-market approach ... the political process determines the initial or
optimal pollution levels, not the polluters bargaining with those who bear the costs of the

pollution.").
166
See Jonathan B. Wiener, Global EnvironmentalRegulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 798-800 (1999) (explicating the concept of regulatory property and
distinguishing it from private property).
67
1 See A.C. PiGoU,THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, 710-19 (4th ed. 1932).
'"James M. Buchanan & William Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371,
373-74 (1962) (noting that externalities are relevant only in limited cases where they will
influence conduct). See also, Steven J. Eagle, EnvironmentalAmenities, Private Property,and
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mattered at the margin, and in a seminal 1960 article by Professor
Ronald Coase, who stressed that conflicts resulted primarily not from
good versus bad uses, but rather from uses of land that are legitimate
but mutually incompatible. 169 This results in "agnosticism about
causation," whereby "whenever two activities come into conflict, it is
misleading to describe one actor as 'the cause' of the problem."1' 70 In
a similar vein, Professor Richard Epstein has criticized Coase's
"causal nihilism":
No matter what the particular facts in any given case, the
conduct of both is in his view causally relevant because the
unwanted interaction could have been avoided or prevented if
either party to the conflict had altered his conduct....
The weakness of the position is its failure to recognize that
for legal purposes the question of causation can be resolved
only after there is an acceptance of some initial distribution of
rights. 171
Coase's indeterminacy was followed by Thomas Grey's assault on
"private property" as having no uniform meaning in a well-known
essay, The Disintegrationof Property.1 2 However, while there are
borderline cases to be sure, the Anglo-American legal tradition is not
bereft of an understanding of reasonable property use, nor of the
meaning of "property" in almost all instances.
B. Different Views of Propertyand EnvironmentalRights
In The Making of Environmental Law, Professor Richard Lazarus
outlined an essential difference between the views of property rights
scholars and environmentalist scholars. 173 Taking as his point 1of
74
comparison Professor Richard Epstein's 1985 book Takings,
Lazarus observed:

Public Policy, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 425 (2004) (discussing externalities in environmental

context).
69

1 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
170
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law And

Economics?, Ill YALE L.J. 357, 391 (2001).
171
Richard. A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: CorrectiveJustice and Its UtilitarianConstraints,

8 J. LEGAL. STUD.49, 58 (1979) (emphasis in original).
172Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property,in PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock
& John W. Chapman eds., NOMOS monograph no. 22, 1980).
173
LAZARUS, supranote 21, at 121.
174RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN (1985).
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Epstein argued that virtually any government regulation
(short of a mere codification of a traditional common law
nuisance) that diminishes property value amounts to a taking
of private property for public use, that, under the Fifth
Amendment, requires the government's payment of "just
compensation." The essential premise of much environmental
law, is, in contrast to Epstein's theory, that the physical
characteristics of the ecosystem generate spatial and temporal
spillovers that require restrictions on the private use of natural
resources far beyond those contemplated by centuries-old
common law tort rules. In short, what Epstein merely
acknowledges is an incidental limit on the exercise of private
property rights in natural resources-the possibility of
physical
spillover effects-modern
environmentalism
perceives as a dominant
characteristic justifying
comprehensive governmental regulation.
This characterization of the property rights position should be
supplemented in two respects. First, Epstein assigns an entire chapter
in his book to "implicit in-kind compensation."'' 75 Employing what
Justice Homes referred to as "reciprocity of advantage,"'' 76 Epstein
notes that "the constitutional command for just compensation may be
fully satisfied by the operation of the statute itself. Each person whose
property is taken by the regulation receives
implicit benefits form the
' 77
parallel takings imposed upon others."'
The other supplement is more subtle and perhaps more important.
Epstein does not advocate "centuries old" common law nuisance
because of distain of environmental harms other than discrete,
physical ones. Rather, he asserts that the "robustness" of the common
law baselines is based on its utility over a wide range of cases. 1 78 It is
only by assigning ownership to possessors of land, and not to those
who assert that they benefit that land by not using their own to create
environmental harm upon it, that our system of ownership and
transferability is workable. 79 The assertion of property rights in lands
upon which one has plausible claim to have conferred environmental
spillover benefits would create a situation reminiscent of Michael
175d. at 195-215.
17See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1921).
177EPSTEIN, supra note 174, at 196.
178See Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle,67 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1369,
1376 (1994).
1791d. at 1380 (citing Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitutionfor Benefit?., 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 57 (1984)).
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Heller's "anticommons," in which ownership is so fractionalized that
it could not be transferred or even usefully employed. 8 0
Of course, the "comprehensive" government regulation advocated
by Lazarus would not really fractionalize interests in land. Rather, it
largely would coalesce use rights in government (although command
and control mechanisms may incorporate market mechanisms). One
could view Lazarus's approach as the mirror image of his conception
of Epstein's view, now with property rights "incidental" to
government ecosystem management and the "centrality" of federal
control. 8 '
In any event, there is little question about the ability of
government to exercise dominion over land for the purpose of
achieving its preferred outcomes regardless of the existence, or
absence, of common law nuisance. The issue is a distributional onewhether
the affected landowner or the public as a whole bears the
82
cost. 1

C. Common Law Remedies for Environmental Wrongs
A discussion of common law remedies for environmental harms
must begin without the preconception that private land ownership is
the cause of environmental problems. 183 That said, there are several
general objections to the protection of environmental rights through
the common law.
. One is that the costs of protecting individual environmental rights
through common law mechanisms are prohibitive in our complex
society, so that prophylactic statutes and sweeping presumptions must
be employed. 84 Another is that what we now understand as the
"economy of nature" is ill-served by treating land as discrete parcels
embodying their owners' development claims.' 85 A final reason is that
18OSee Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Propery in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
181Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Role of Legal Innovation in Ecosystem Management:
Perspectivesfrom American Local Government Law, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 745, 749 (1997). "The
shared view among the founders of the emerging ecosystem management movement is that
federal energy is essential to translate the principles of biodiversity protection into nationwide
public1 policy."
Id.
s2 See supraPart lI.D.
183See James L. Huffman, Land Ownership and Environmental Regulation, 25 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 591, 592 (1999) (referring to this assumption as the "orthodox view").
184See supra Part II.B.
i85 Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: UnderstandingLucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442 (1993) (discussing the two
"fundamentally different views of property rights," the "transformative economy," where
individuals reshape discrete parcels for economic use, and the "economy of nature," where "an
ecological perspective views land as consisting of systems defined by their function, not by
man-made boundaries.").
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environmental rights inure to the benefit of all constituent elements of
the ecosystem that that these rights hardly are apt to be established
and protected in litigation centered in claims of individual members
of the dominant species.186 However, those subscribing 8to7 this view
should not expect much relief from the legislature, either.1
The utility of the common law lies in its basic adherence to settled
expectations about rights. Such expectations "are the foundation of
effective cooperation in any large, complex society. ' ' 188 Anderson and
Leal assert that
[a]t the heart of free market environmentalism is a system of
well-specified property rights to natural resources. Whether
these rights are held by individuals, corporations, non-profit
environmental groups, or communal groups, a discipline is
of
imposed on resource users because the wealth of the owner
189
the property right is at stake if bad decisions are made.
The notion of free market land stewardship is rejected by others.
According to Professor James Karp:
Stewardship must be a shared community ethic to be
successful. Some individuals left unguided, however, are apt
to favor short-term, selfish interests. As religion and custom
fade deeper into the cultural background, the civil religion of
law must be used as arbiter of correct behavior. The scope of
the duty of stewardship must be defined with sensitivity to
the legitimate needs of protecting private property rights.' 90
However, even owners who contemplate that their involvement
with the resource will be short-lived have a strong incentive to
conserve it, since their stewardship of the resource largely determines
the price at which they could sell. 19' Anderson and Leal also argue
that natural resource economics has "approached resource policy as
though there is a 'socially efficient' allocation of resources that will
be reached when scientific managers understand the relevant tradeoffs and act to achieve the most efficient solution."' 92 In this context,
18 6

See supra Part I.B.

7

18 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
188 PAUL HEYNE, THE ECONOMIC WAY OF THINKING 366 (7th ed. 1994).
189ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 159, at 3.

190James P. Karp, A PrivatePropertyDuty of Stewardship: Changing Our Land Ethic, 23
ENVTL. L. 735, 755 (1993).
191See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 159, at 3 (noting that owners of transferable
resources
must consider).
92
1 Terry L. Anderson and Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environmentalism: Hindsight and
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Professor Karp's reference to the "civil religion of law" is reminiscent
of Professor Dan Tarlock's observation that we tend "to respond to
science
the contingencies and uncertainties inherent in environmental
93
scientific."',
than
rather
ethical
as
problems
reclassifying
by
While it is tempting to affirm our commitment to the environment
with extensive legislation, common law nuisance continues to have
application to environmental problems, even those on the largest
scale. In September 2006, the attorney general of California brought a
lawsuit based on global warming against major auto manufacturers in
federal district court. The action was based on federal and state
common law.
The complaint alleged that under federal and state common law
the automakers have created a public nuisance by producing "millions
of vehicles that collectively emit massive quantities of carbon
dioxide," a greenhouse gas that traps atmospheric heat and causes
global warming. Under the law, a "public nuisance" is an
unreasonable interference with a public right, or an action that
interferes with or causes harm to life, health or property. The
complaint asks the court to hold the defendants liable for damages,
including future harm, caused by their ongoing, substantial
94
contribution to the public nuisance of global warming.
The California action is parallel to the global warming challenge
brought under the Clean Air Act195 in Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency,196 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that the EPA was authorized by the Clean Air
Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles,
should it form a "judgment" that such emissions contribute to climate
change. The agency's discretion to avoid taking regulatory action was
limited to situations where it determines that greenhouse gases do not
contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable
explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to
determine whether they do. Consequent to the Supreme Court's
district court permitted the broad-ranging California
action, the U.S. 97
case to proceed.'

Foresight, 8 CORNELL J.L.& PUB. POL'Y 111, 112 (1998).
193Tarlock, supra note 72. See generally supra Introduction.
194Press release, Calif. Dept. of Justice, Office of the Atty. General, "Attorney General
Lockyer Files Lawsuit Against "Big Six" Automakers for Global Warming Damages in
=
California," (September 20, 2006) available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id

1338&year-2006&month--9&PHPSESSID=5a6ccdd8Oel 72b73e0742a24e8d9a Ia.
19542 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a)(1) (2004).
127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
196
'97 Order on Motions and Counter-Motions for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Claims
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In addition to raising important constitutional issues, cases like
Massachusetts v. EPA, in which courts are asked to set fundamental
national policies or to force administrative agencies to do so, are
troubling from environmental and common law perspectives.
Lawsuits to force administrative agencies to limit carbon dioxide
(C0 2) emissions seem like an example of the skipping to policy
instruments without debate about fundamentals that Professor Dan
Tarlock cautioned against.198 From a common law perspective, on the
other hand, such litigation presupposes aggregate rights that go far
beyond rectification of harm to the property rights of some by others
in their bilateral relationship.1 99
A good example of the problem of going beyond the bilateral
relationship is Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 200 where

a federal district court recently found a claim to abate "the public
nuisance of global warming" nonjusticiable, since it required "an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.,

20

That court found that the claims regarding global

warming were unique in the context of "pollution-as-public-nuisance
on so many areas of national and
cases" as they "touched
20 2
international policy.

On the other hand, in In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
Products Liability Litigation, the same court found that a case
involving the claim by many municipalities that a gasoline additive
contaminated their ground water was not precluded by the political
question doctrine.20 3 The court distinguished American Electric
Power based on the determination "that the claims regarding global
warming were unique in the context of 'pollution-as-public-nuisance
cases' as they 'touched on so many areas of national and international
policy.'

20 4

While in American Electric Power the plaintiffs had

sought "to enact broad limits" on CO 2 emissions and the political
branches "had issued explicit statements 'on the issue of global
climate change in general,"' they "specifically refused" to limit CO 2

emissions, took steps to "study and research" global warming issues,

for Relief on EPCA Preemption and Foreign Policy Preemption, CV F 04-6663 AWl LJO,
December 11, 2007, available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms-attachments/press/pdfs/nl509 656
order_ 12-12-07.pdf.
198
See Tarlock, supra note 57.
199
See generally, WEINRIB, supra note 2.
200406

F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 272.
201
202Id.
203438 F.Supp.2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
20
4Id. at 298 (quoting American Electric Power, 406 F.Supp.2d at 272).
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and "directed the Secretary of State to 'coordinate U.S. negotiations
concerning global climate change.' 20 5 Also, "while plaintiffs in the
global warming case sought quasi legislative remedies," including an
agreement to cap emissions and reduce them annually, the plaintiffs
here "simply request that defendants
be prevented from 'engaging in
20 6
further releases of MTBE.'
In more routine cases, common law public nuisance has served as
a satisfactory basis for environmental remediation. According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[a] public nuisance is an
unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general
207
public.
In its inception a public, or common, nuisance was an
infringement of the rights of the Crown.... By the time of
Edward III [1312-77] the principle had been extended to the
invasion of the rights of the public, represented by the Crown,
by such things as interference with the operation of a public
market 8or smoke from a lime-pit that inconvenienced a whole
20
town.

Public nuisances included interference with the public health,
safety, morals, peace and comfort, and convenience.20 9 It is applicable
cases of "widely disseminated bad odors, dust and smoke,"
obstruction of highways or navigable stream, and similar situations.1 0
There is a large body of caselaw involving environmental public
nuisances, such 214
as those involving odors, 2 11 dust, 2 12 emissions, 213 and
pollution.
water
While the enactment of federal and state environmental legislation
since the 1970s might have been expected to reduce the amount of
common law public nuisance litigation, "public nuisance actions have
continued to
play an important role in the area of environmental
protection.,'215 The number of environmental nuisance cases filed in
20

5Id.at 301.

2
06Id. (emphasis

in original).

207 RESTATEMENT

2

08Id.at
2
09Id.at

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(i) (1977).

cmt. a.
cmt. b.

210Id.
211See,

e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952);
Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 239 S.W. 724 (Ark. 1922).
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state court has risen from 50 during the 1960s to 184 during the
1990s, and the number of federal cases during the same period have
risen from 7 to 178.216
One important attribute of public nuisance actions, as opposed to
private nuisance, is that collective action and free riding problems are
attenuated. 22717 The rights of residents of a town, or state, who are
deprived of enjoyment of their lands and similar rights do not have to
pass the hat to raise money to vindicate their rights. Their town
solicitor or state attorney general may act for them.
D. Rules vs. Standards
The efficacy of common law remedies for nuisance is
demonstrated by the fact that statutory enactments are not generally
demonstrable as superior, or even equally satisfactory. Common law
decisionmaking consists of ex post inquiry into whether given
conduct conformed with relevant community standards. It therefore is
case specific. It is juxtaposed statutory decisionmaking, which
consists of ex ante general determinations that individuals are
obligated to obey specific rules in the future.
Professor Cass Sunstein has noted that "enthusiasm for genuinely
case-specific decisions makes no sense" because "[flew, if any
judgments about particular cases are entirely particular," and
"[a]lmost any judgment depends on the use of principles or
reasons." 218 On the other hand, however, enthusiasm for rules often
"seems senseless too," given the lack of relevant information or need
for subtle judgments.219 Professor Louis Kaplow has suggested that
rules are more expensive to promulgate and standards more expensive
to apply, that rules should be employed in cases where many
activities might be expected to follow the same general pattern. 220 He
also states that standards may be favored where it is not plausible to
formulate legal commands as rules, giving as an illustration when we
are "unable to specify in advance proper disposal techniques for all
hazardous substances because we cannot foresee all potential
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hazards-whereas some hazards, and how best to address them, may
become apparent when they arise. 22 1
E. The Interplay Between Common Law Nuisance and Regulatory
Takings
As was noted earlier,222 since the 1970s environmental protection
has been perceived largely as a matter of statutory law, with
corresponding attenuation in the importance of common law
nuisance. However, as Justice Holmes famously noted, statutes that
limit property rights may go "too far., 223 He warned that "a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the de-sire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change., 224 To be sure, the Supreme Court generally
has upheld the application of environ-mental legislation against
regulatory takings challenges. 225 However, occasionally the Court has
found that environmental regulators interpret their powers too
broadly, 2 6 or that restrictions imposed for environmental purposes
may constitute regulatory takings.227 In Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,228 the Court held that a beachfront regulation
depriving a landowner of all economically beneficial use was a
compensable taking, since government could not impose such a
severe limitation unless it merely reflected "the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership. 2 29
This "background principles" language in Lucas may turn out to
offer strong support to environmental regulation, with localities
successfully defending takings challenges on the grounds that owners
did not possess the asserted rights under such background
Id. at 599-600.
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principles.230 Indeed, the language in Lucas noting that "changed
circumstances" might remove the inference of lack of common law
prohibition2 31 might be the basis for a "new nuisance" jurisprudence
asserting a reevaluation of common law nuisance and property rights
respecting the environment.2 32
CONCLUSION

The genius of the common law is the fact that it combines the
protection of expectations with the possibility of incremental change.
There is opportunity for courts, in cooperation with the parties, to
fashion settlements that improve upon the outcomes for property and
the environment that is apt to be achieved under top down statutory
regulation. Given the state of scientific uncertainty and the tendency
to apply rules before articulating policy, no decision maker can
impose command and control outcomes with confidence.
By focusing on the immediate bilateral dispute before it, a
common law court may provide a contribution to the accretion of
wisdom that permits a healthy evolution of our understanding of, and
protection for, both property and the environment.
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